ABSTRACT For enterprise systems running on public clouds in which the servers are outside the control domain of the enterprise, access control that was traditionally executed by reference monitors deployed on the system servers can no longer be trusted. Hence, a self-contained security scheme is regarded as an effective way for protecting outsourced data. However, building such a scheme that can implement the access control policy of the enterprise has become an important challenge. In this paper, we propose a self-contained data protection mechanism called RBAC-CPABE by integrating role-based access control (RBAC), which is widely employed in enterprise systems, with the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). First, we present a data-centric RBAC (DC-RBAC) model that supports the specification of finegrained access policy for each data object to enhance RBAC's access control capabilities. Then, we fuse DC-RBAC and CP-ABE by expressing DC-RBAC policies with the CP-ABE access tree and encrypt data using CP-ABE. Because CP-ABE enforces both access control and decryption, access authorization can be achieved by the data itself. A security analysis and experimental results indicate that RBAC-CPABE maintains the security and efficiency properties of the CP-ABE scheme on which it is based, but substantially improves the access control capability. Finally, we present an implemented framework for RBAC-CPABE to protect privacy and enforce access control for data stored in the cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud computing, an increasing number of enterprises and organizations use cloud servers as their system platform. Today, role-based access control (RBAC) model is the most popular model used in enterprise systems; however, this model has severe security problems when applied to cloud systems. A classic RBAC model uses reference monitors running on data servers to implement authorization. However, the servers in the cloud are out of the control of enterprise domains and, therefore, must be considered untrusted by default. Hence, building an effective data protection mechanism for cloud-based enterprise systems has become a major challenge.
Currently, encryption is the primary mechanism used in clouds to ensure data security. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [1] suggests that an excellent method of increasing data security is to keep data encrypted both in transit and when stored within the cloud. Although classic encryption schemes such as public-key encryption and identity-based encryption (IBE) [2] can ensure data confidentiality, they cannot enforce effective access control. However, if the encrypted data were to feature an internalized access policy and was able to authorize or deny users based on the access policy, then confidentiality and access control could be achieved by the data itself rather than having to rely on the untrusted cloud servers. This type of protection model, which is referred to as self-contained data protection in this paper, not only minimizes the reliance on the cloud servers but also prevents unauthorized data access and tampering during transmission. Therefore, self-contained data protection essentially gives data the ability to ensure its own security, and it is an effective mechanism to protect data in cloud. However, neither RBAC alone or classic public encryptionor even the combination of both techniques [3] - [5] can satisfy the requirements of self-contained data protection. The reasons are as follows:
• In RBAC, access permissions are assigned through roles and cannot be directly assigned to a user, which is insufficiently fine-grained. For example, suppose that user u x needs to be granted permission p. In the RBAC model there are two ways to achieve this goal. The first approach is to assign the permission p to one of u x 's roles r. However, it means that all users who are assigned to role r are also granted permission p, which may introduce security problems. The second approach is to add a new role r' and assign it to u x . Although this approach solves the problem raised by the first approach, adding an additional role r' increases the complexity of the system-especially when such authorizations are very frequent. Thus, neither approach can effectively achieve the goal.
• RBAC describes an access control policy for the full collection of data in the entire enterprise rather than for each data object. By defining roles and assigning those roles to users, RBAC can achieve data protection. However, data is only one constituent of a system (i.e. users, roles, permission assignments and so forth can have constraints, but data cannot). Hence, RBAC is targeted mainly to integral control of the data in the system, but it cannot meet the specific security requirements of each data object.
• RBAC needs to be implemented using reference monitors that run on the data servers. Because cloud servers may not always be trusted, depending on them to enforce access control introduces insecurities into the system. Therefore, the RBAC model and its enforcement mechanism cannot be directly applied to a self-contained data protection mechanism.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [6] provides support for self-contained data protection. In ABE, both a user's private key and the ciphertext are associated with some attributes. When the attributes used in the ciphertext and the attributes in a user's private key match, the user can decrypt successfully. In this way, ABE achieves both encryption and access control simultaneously. There are two variants of ABE, namely, key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes and the private key is associated with an access policy [7] . In CP-ABE, the concept is reversed: the ciphertext is associated with an access policy and the private key is associated with a set of attributes [8] . Between these two variants of ABE, CP-ABE is more suitable for an enterprise environment, and it is an ideal fundamental scheme for implementing a self-contained data protection mechanism.
Although ABE is capable of enforcing access control, it is incompatible with the widely used RBAC model because it cannot support role inheritance. Zhu et al. [9] addressed this problem by presenting an ABE scheme with attribute hierarchy in which each role was mapped to one or more attributes depending on a migration proxy. In practice, to provide flexible access control, attributes containing complex operators such as the NOT operator are also useful. But this method has no solution. To enhance the policy expression ability of ABE, researchers have presented various schemes to support either NOT or comparison operators (i.e., >, ≥, < and ≤). Among them, only the Extended CP-ABE (ECP-ABE) [10] , [11] scheme is able to handle all types of operators simultaneously and can be easily extended to support other operators. Therefore, we opt to integrate RBAC with ECP-ABE.
In this paper, we construct a self-contained protection mechanism for outsourced enterprise data. In addition to being compatible with the existing RBAC system, our method also allows users to specify other required policies for each data object. Compared with traditional protection mechanisms, the most prominent characteristic of our solution is that it gives data the ability to ensure its own security using both encryption and a classic access control model without depending on the servers on which it resides. The contributions of this paper are presented as follows.
(1) To specify a flexible access policy for each data object under RBAC model, we propose a data-centric RBAC (DC-RBAC) model. In DC-RBAC, the access policy is bounded by data, which supports self-contained data protection. In addition to role constraints, DC-RBAC also contains user attribute constraints and environment constraints, which correspond to information about the authorized users and contextual information about the environment, respectively. Hence, DC-RBAC is a more expressive and fine-grained access control model. (2) We integrate DC-RBAC with a CP-ABE scheme (i.e. ECP-ABE) and propose a self-contained data protection scheme called RBAC-CPABE. To support all types of constraints with DC-RBAC, we first extend ECP-ABE to support role assignment and inheritance. Then, we present a mapping model to transform the DC-RBAC access policy to the ECP-ABE access tree. Finally, the data object is encrypted with ECP-ABE. Through this design, RBAC-CPABE gives data the ability to carry finegrained access policy and enforce access control entirely by itself.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work on RBAC and ABE. Section III introduces some background knowledge used in this paper. The DC-RBAC model is presented in Section IV. In Section V, we first present the method of expressing DC-RBAC policy with ECP-ABE. Then we propose our self-contained data protection scheme RBAC-CPABE and analyze its security and efficiency. Section VI presents an implemented version of RBAC-CPABE. Finally, conclusions can be found in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK A. INTEGRATING RBAC WITH CRYPTOGRAPHY
The RBAC model was first proposed by Ferraiolo and Kuhn in 1992 [12] and was widely studied in the mid-1990s. The RBAC model introduced roles between users and permissions. Permissions are assigned to roles rather than users; VOLUME 5, 2017 users must be assigned to a role to gain the permissions assigned to that role. The RBAC model greatly simplified permission management; consequently, it has become the most widely used access control model in the past few years. By developing different policies, RBAC can achieve the requirements of both discretionary access controls (DAC) and mandatory access controls (MAC).
Some studies have focused on combining RBAC with various encryption schemes to protect data. Crampton [13] introduced a new characterization of RBAC policies, namely, using the partial order relation to describe the policies. This approach transforms RBAC policies into information flow policies; then, it uses cryptographic enforcements of the policies to construct a cryptographic RBAC mechanism. Zhu et al. [3] - [5] proposed a role-key hierarchy model (RKH) consisting of a cryptographic RBAC model that can support role hierarchies. In RKH, each role corresponds to a unique role-key, and users are assigned an exclusive user-key associated with each role to which they belong. However, because users must maintain a private key corresponding to each role, this method increases the burden of key management for users-especially when a user is assigned many roles.
RBAC can also be combined with ABE to protect data in cloud computing. Zhu et al. [9] proposed an RBAC-compatible ABE to migrate the RBAC system into ABE-based data protection. In this scheme, each role is mapped to one or more attributes depending on a migration proxy. Then an ABE scheme with attribute hierarchy was presented to encrypt data with the mapped attributes. Zhou et al. [14] proposed a role-based encryption (RBE) scheme that combined RBAC with CP-ABE for secure cloud storage. In RBE, data is encrypted with the role's public parameters, and users who are assigned to the role are able to decrypt the ciphertext. However, RBE cannot support role inheritance. In the cryptographic role-based access control model [15] implemented via CP-ABE, each role is associated with an access tree. Users whose attributes satisfy the role's policy tree can obtain permission for decryption. This scheme can deal with dynamic policies that include permission and role assignment modifications and file updates. However, it requires the data owner to perform all the operations, which is both unreasonable and unrealistic in a cloud computing scenario.
B. ABE
ABE is an extension of public-key encryption that allows users to encrypt and decrypt data based on attributes. The greatest advantage of ABE is that its encryption key and decryption key are not in a one-to-one relationship; an encryption key can correspond to multiple decryption keys. The underlying basis of ABE is a fuzzy identitybased encryption (FIBE) proposed by Sahai and Waters [6] . Goyal et al. [7] further developed FIBE and introduced the idea of KP-ABE, in which the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes and the private key is associated with an access tree. Later, Bethencourt et al. [8] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme called the BSW scheme. CP-ABE reversed the idea in KP-ABE; in CP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with an access tree while the private key is associated with a set of attributes.
The original ABE schemes were proposed based on a tree structure that is relatively expressive and can support AND, OR and threshold operators (an (m, n)-threshold means a solution must satisfy at least m constraints among total n constraints; henceforth, we refer to an (m, n)-threshold as ''threshold'' for short). Subsequently, some approaches [16] , [17] based on the Linear Secret Share Scheme (LSSS) were proposed. The expressive ability of LSSS nearly equals that of a tree structure except that each attribute can be used only once in a LSSS structure. There are also some schemes [18] - [20] that support only the threshold operator were proposed. In fact, the AND operator is an (n, n)-threshold; therefore, those schemes also can support AND operator. In addition to AND, OR and threshold operators, there are some more complex operators such as NOT and comparison operators (i.e., >, ≥, < and ≤) that are particularly useful in practice, but cannot be directly expressed.
To address this problem, some studies focused on improving the expressive ability of CP-ABE. Cheung and Newport [21] presented the first CP-ABE scheme supports policies containing the NOT operator, henceforth referred to as CN. However, its expression ability is still not sufficient because CN supports only the AND and NOT operators. Based on CN, some CP-ABE schemes have been proposed to achieve various goals such as hidden access policy [22] , constant ciphertext length [23] , constant private key length [24] and so on. Similar to CN, these approaches support only AND and NOT operators. Junod and Karlov [25] proposed an attribute-based broadcast encryption (ABBE) scheme based on CP-ABE that can support AND, OR and NOT operators. Ostrovsky et al. [26] presented a KP-ABE scheme that can represent non-monotonic access policies and supports NOT as well as AND, OR and threshold operators. Other schemes [27] - [29] have been proposed to support the NOT operator using the same technique. TABLE 1 lists the expression ability of various ABE schemes.
Policies containing comparison operators are also frequently used in practical applications. Although the schemes discussed so far can support the NOT operator, none of them can handle the comparison operators. BSW uses a ''bag of bits'' to express policies containing comparison operators. However, in their approach numerical values must be represented in binary form, which is complex and difficult to use in practice. Zhu et al. [30] presented a comparison-based encryption (CBE) scheme to express various comparisonbased policies; however it does not support the NOT operator. Lang et al. proposed an Extended CP-ABE (ECP-ABE) scheme [10] , [11] which is very expressive. By introducing extended leaf nodes, the access tree was enhanced to support all types of logical and arithmetic comparison operators, including AND, OR, threshold, >, ≥, <, ≤ and NOT, among others. ECP-ABE is the first scheme that can support policies containing all the operators simultaneously. Waters [31] presented a functional encryption mechanism whereby an access policy can be expressed using regular language. The approach defined some states including a start state and some accept states. If a string set can be transited from the start state to an accept state using a transition function, it is considered a successful decryption.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. CP-ABE SCHEME
In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with an access policy, and the private key is associated with a set of attributes. If and only if the attributes in a user's private key satisfy the access policy is the user able to decrypt the ciphertext successfully. The CP-ABE scheme consists of 4 algorithms: Setup, Keygen, Encrypt and Decrypt [8] . The model of the CP-ABE scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 . There are three parties in the model: the private key generator (PKG), the encryption party and the decryption party. PKG is a trusted party. It is responsible for initializing the system and generating the master key mk and the public parameters pk with the Setup algorithm, authenticating users' attributes and generating private keys for users with the Keygen algorithm. The public parameters pk are sent to the encryption party and decryption party, and the private key is sent to the decryption party. The encryption party is the owner of message M . Its responsibility is to specify an access policy T and encrypt M with T . The decryption party is a requestor of the encrypted data. If it has no private key, it first sends a private key request to PKG. Then, using the private key, it decrypts the ciphertext obtained from the encryption party.
B. ECP-ABE SCHEME ECP-ABE was proposed to improve the expressive ability of CP-ABE [10] , [11] . By introducing extended leaf nodes into the access policy tree, ECP-ABE can support access policies involving complex operators including NOT, >, ≥, < and ≤ in addition to AND, OR and threshold. More specially, in the access policy tree of ECP-ABE, the original leaf node used in classic CP-ABE is replaced by an extended leaf node that has an operator node with at least two children. One of the children is referred to as an attribute name node; the others are referred to as attribute value nodes, as shown in Fig. 2 
(a).
The attribute name node and the attribute value node denote the attribute name and attribute value, respectively, that are associated with the operator. The attribute described by an extended leaf node is called an extended attribute. Meanwhile, the range of the threshold value k of the extended leaf node is changed to less than 0 from the original value 1. Different values of k (k < 0) denote specific operators. The ECP-ABE scheme offers three operator types:
• Logical operator: NOT. Using this structure, ECP-ABE can express policies that contain complex operators. Fig. 2 (b) shows an example that expresses the constraint ''name NOT Bob'' as an extended attribute.
The access tree with extended leaf nodes is called an extended tree, while the traditional access tree is called a standard tree. An extended tree can be transformed to an equivalent standard tree by removing the attribute name/value nodes, converting the operator node to a standard leaf node and assigning the extended attribute described by the extended leaf node to the standard leaf node. Then, the extended tree and the equivalent standard tree express the same access policy. During the encryption phase, the extended tree is transformed to the equivalent standard tree and then used to encrypt data. To decrypt a ciphertext, the decryption party needs to apply for a private key by giving PKG the extended parts of the access tree. Then, PKG verifies whether the user's attributes satisfy the extended attributes with an attribute verification algorithm and generates a private key according to the verification result. A more detailed description of the process can be found in [10] and [11] .
Experiment results show that ECP-ABE is as efficient as the CP-ABE scheme it is based on, and it has also been proven secure against a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) under a wellstudied complexity-theoretic problem in the standard model.
C. SECURITY MODEL
In the CP-ABE scheme, security under CPA is modeled by a game between a challenger and an adversary [7] . It includes the following six phases:
• Init. The adversary sends the challenger an access policy tree T that he wants to challenge.
• Setup. The challenger initializes the system to generate public parameters pk and master keys mk. Then he sends pk to the adversary.
• Phase 1. The adversary is allowed to make private key requests for any attribute set w = {a i |a i ∈ W , a i / ∈ T } where W is the attribute universe in the system. Then, the challenger returns sk w to the adversary.
• Challenge. The adversary sends two equal length messages m 0 and m 1 to the challenger. The challenger chooses a random θ ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts m θ with the access policy tree T . Then the ciphertext C T is returned to the adversary.
• Phase 2. The same as Phase 1.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess θ ∈ {0, 1}. If no polynomial-time adversary can win the game with a non-negligible advantage, the CP-ABE scheme is considered secure against CPA. The adversary's advantage of winning is defined as ε = |Pr[θ = θ ] − 1/2|.
IV. DATA-CENTRIC RBAC MODEL A. MAIN IDEA
The RBAC model simplifies the management of user permissions in a system. However, as mentioned in Section I, in the context of self-contained data protection, the RBAC model needs to be able to describe fine-grained access policies that are appropriate to specific data and support arbitrary constraints. In other words, data owners should not only be able to specify access policies for data objects at the role-level but also define other necessary constraints.
To meet these requirements, a data-centric RBAC (DC-RBAC) model is needed. The DC-RBAC model should support role assignments, inheritance and constraints. It may appear that DC-RBAC is quite similar to RBAC 3 which is a consolidation of RBAC 1 and RBAC 2 . However, constraints in DC-RBAC and RBAC 3 are quite different. The constraints in RBAC 3 roughly include 4 cases: (1) mutually exclusive roles (i.e. separation of duties); (2) cardinality constraints (i.e. limiting the number of users assigned to a role and the number of roles assigned to a permission); (3) prerequisite constraints (i.e., a user can be assigned to a role A only if that user is already assigned to role B, and permission p can be assigned to a role A only if role A already possesses permission q); and (4) constraints associated with sessions, such as the number of sessions that a user can have active at the same time. Clearly, RBAC 3 defines its policies at the system level to manage user's privileges for multiple data objects. Its goal is to protect the security of the whole system.
In DC-RBAC, the situation is different-the security objective of the system is achieved by protecting each data object. Therefore, the security requirement of each data object becomes the basis of a DC-RBAC policy. Because RBAC 3 and DC-RBAC focus on different goals, the constraint compositions (which are important parts in a policy) are quite dissimilar. Regarding the 4 types of constraints in RBAC 3 , the first constraint can be expressed using the NOT operator in DC-RBAC; the parts of the second and third constraints associated with role assignment should be kept in DC-RBAC, while the parts associated with permission assignment will be abandoned; and the fourth constraint is also abandoned since sessions are no longer needed in DC-RBAC.
Another significant difference between DC-RBAC and classical RBAC is that RBAC supports only positive role assignment (i.e. role = R), while DC-RBAC includes both positive and negative assignment (i.e., role! = R), and both types of assignment support role inheritance. In positive assignment, role = R represents that role R and its senior roles will obtain access permission. In negative assignment, role! = R represents that neither role R nor its junior roles can access the data. The data-role assignment includes both positive and negative assignments, while the user-role assignment includes only positive assignment.
We also add other 2 constraint types: user attribute constraints and environment constraints. The user attribute constraints contain constraints associated with a user's attributes such as name, department, security level, etc. The environment constraints comprise constraints about contextual environmental information such as access time, IP address, etc. Only users who satisfy role assignments as well as both constraints can obtain access permission.
Benefiting from role assignment and the new added constraints, DC-RBAC is more flexible; consequently, the authorization can be assigned to users as well as to roles. For example, if a data owner wants to add an authorization for user u x , he only needs to add a constraint ''name = u x '' in the data access policy. When u x no longer needs the permission, the data owner can simply delete this policy. The data owner never needs to grant additional permissions to the roles which u x belongs; therefore, the privileges of other users assigned to the same roles as u x are not affected. Also, there is no need to add a new role for u x to grant sole access to u x , leaving the number of roles in the system unchanged, which is helpful in minimizing the complexity of authorization management. Therefore, DC-RBAC can support fine-grained access control, and it is flexible and efficient.
B. STRUCTURE OF DC-RBAC
The DC-RBAC model consists of five sets of entities called data (D), users (U ), roles (R), user attribute constraints (Ac) and environment constraints (Ec), as shown in Fig. 3 . data represents a data object that needs to be protected. users are human beings who want to access the protected data. roles, user attribute constraints and environment constraints together constitute the access policy of the data. There are also two parts called user intrinsic attributes (Att(U )), which indicates a user's intrinsic attribute information, and user environment information (Env(U )), which indicates the contextual information of the user's environment, that correspond to the user attribute constraints (Ac) and the environment constraints (Ec), respectively, as indicated by the dashed arrows from Ac to Att(U ) and Ec to Env(U ) in Fig. 3 .
The assignment relationships in DC-RBAC include the data-user assignment (DU ), the data-role assignment (DR), the user-role assignment (UR), the data-user attribute constraint assignment (DAc) and the data-environment constraint assignment (DEc). All these assignments are many-tomany relationships, as indicated by the double-headed arrows in Fig. 3 .
The DC-RBAC policy is formed as follows.
policy(data) = (roles, user attribute constraints, environment constraints)
In Eq. (1), the symbol represents the logical combinations of all the constraints, which include AND, OR and threshold operators. The following definition formalizes the above discussion.
Definition 1:
The DC-RBAC has the following components.
• D, U , R, Ac and Ec indicate data, users, roles, user attribute constraints and environment constraints respectively. Att(U ) and Env(U ) indicate a user's intrinsic attributes and contextual information of the environment, respectively.
• DU ⊆ D × U , a many-to-many data-to-user assignment relation.
• DR ⊆ D × R, a many-to-many data-to-role assignment relation. It includes positive assignment (PDR) and negative assignment (NDR).
• UR ⊆ U × R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation. It just includes positive assignment.
• DAc ⊆ D × Ac, a many-to-many data-to-user attribute constraint assignment relation.
• DEc ⊆ D × Ec, a many-to-many data-to-environment constraint assignment relation.
• RH ⊆ R×R, a partial order on R called the role hierarchy or role dominance relation, also written as or .
• Att(U ) is a function that returns the intrinsic attributes of a user U .
• Env(U ) is a function that returns the contextual information of U 's environment. In this model, a DU relationship is established only when the user's roles, intrinsic attributes and environment information satisfy the access policy of the data. The data d can be accessed by the following users.
Users(d)
Where u x ∈ U and r, r ∈ R. The expression r r means r' is neither equal to nor junior to r. The symbol represents logical operators such as AND, OR and threshold. Eq. (2) shows that data d can be accessed by user u x only if u x satisfies the following kinds of constraints that are connected by the logic operators : (i) u x 's roles must be equal to or senior to the roles that are positively assigned to d; (ii) u x 's roles must be neither equal to nor junior to the roles that are negatively assigned to d; (iii) u x 's intrinsic attributes must satisfy the user attribute constraints of d; and (iv) u x 's environment information must satisfy the environment constraints of d.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF RBAC-CPABE A. MOTIVATION
The self-contained data protection mechanism requires that data carry its own access policy and be capable of VOLUME 5, 2017 implementing authorization according to that policy. DC-RABC is an access control model that can enforce datacentric, flexible and fine-grained role-based access control. However, the model cannot give data the ability to authorize users entirely by itself; access policy verification may still require the help of other parties. Hence, it is necessary to build a mechanism that can eliminate the dependence on third-party servers. At present, encryption is the primary mechanism to achieve data self-protection, and CP-ABE provides the possibility for integrating encryption and access control. By fusing DC-RBAC into CP-ABE, data can be encrypted with the access policy of DC-RBAC and the policy can be verified during decryption. Only those users whose attributes satisfy the DC-RBAC access policy will be able to decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, we integrate DC-RBAC with CP-ABE and construct the RBAC-CPABE scheme, which provides a feasible way to achieve self-contained data protection.
A CP-ABE scheme that successfully supports DC-RBAC must meet the following requirements:
(1) It must support role inheritance (e.g. a senior role can inherit permissions from its successor roles). A role inheritance tree will be defined in advance to indicate the hierarchy relationships. (2) It must support policies containing AND, OR, threshold, NOT, comparison operators and so forth because the constraints of DC-RBAC policy may contain such complex operators.
The ECP-ABE scheme proposed by Lang et al. [10] , [11] can handle any type of complex operator and can be extended to support role inheritance easily. Therefore, we choose to integrate ECP-ABE with DC-RBAC to construct the selfcontained data protection scheme RBAC-CPABE.
B. EXPRESSING DC-RBAC POLICY WITH ECP-ABE
To construct RBAC-CPABE, two problems must be solved. The first problem involves how to support role assignment in ECP-ABE. Because role assignment includes role inheritance, it should be expressed as an extended attribute. Although negative assignment (i.e. role! = R) can be expressed by reusing the NOT operator, there is no suitable extended leaf node that can express positive assignment (i.e. role = R). The second problem involves how to express a DC-RBAC access policy (as described in Section IV-B) using the extended tree of ECP-ABE. This is necessary because DC-RBAC and ECP-ABE have different policy models.
To solve these problems, we first define a new threshold value for the operator node in ECP-ABE so it can support role assignment. Then, we present a policy mapping model to transform a DC-RBAC policy into an equivalent extended tree form.
1) SUPPORTING ROLE ASSIGNMENT
To support the positive role assignment relationship in DC-RBAC, we need to improve the policy expression ability of ECP-ABE. Fortunately, the threshold value k of the operator node can be redefined and extended to meet various requirements. Hence, we extend ECP-ABE by assigning a different value to k. ECP-ABE defined 9 values for k to denote comparison, interval and logical operators. Here, we define k = −10 to express positive role assignment and reuse k = −1 to express negative assignment. The values of k and their corresponding operators are listed in TABLE 2. 
2) MAPPING DC-RBAC POLICY TO THE ECP-ABE ACCESS TREE
In this section, we present a mapping model to transform a DC-RBAC access policy to an ECP-ABE access tree, as shown in Fig. 4 . The DC-RBAC policy is expressed in the form of Eq. (1) in Section IV-B. The symbol '' '' in Eq. (1) represents logical operators; we externalize it as ''AND , OR, threshold'' in the mapping model. Specifically, when k > 0, it represents the threshold value of an internal node or a leaf node; and when k < 0, it represents the extended operators shown in TABLE 2.
The mapping rules are described as follows. (1) The ''AND , OR, threshold'' is the logical combination of the DC-RBAC role assignments, user attribute constraints and environment constraints. These correspond to the internal nodes of the ECP-ABE access tree, as shown in light blue in Fig. 4 .
(2) The role assignments, user attribute constraints and environment constraints of DC-RBAC correspond to the leaf nodes and extended leaf nodes of the ECP-ABE access tree. They are shown in dark blue in Fig. 4 . Specifically, because role assignments usually involve role inheritance, they are expressed as extended leaf nodes. If the user attribute constraints and environment constraints include complex operators, they are expressed as extended leaf nodes; otherwise, they are expressed as leaf nodes. For instance, one access policy of DC-RBAC is described as follows:
AND security − level ≥ 4)) AND 9 : 00 ≤ time ≤ 17 : 00)
According to the mapping rules, the symbols AND and OR are expressed as internal nodes. The constraints role = product − employee and role ! = sales − employee are role assignments and must be expressed as extended leaf nodes. The constraints security − level ≥ 4 and 9 : 00 ≤ time ≤ 17 : 00 include comparison operators and also need to be expressed as extended leaf nodes. The access tree mapped from this DC-RBAC policy is shown in Fig. 5 , where the symbol ''∧'' represents AND and the symbol ''∨'' represents OR. C. THE RBAC-CPABE SCHEME
1) ROLE INHERITANCE VERIFICATION
Although ECP-ABE can express role assignment with an added threshold value for the operator node, it has no ability to handle role inheritance. To address this limitation, we modify the attribute verification algorithm in the key generation phase of ECP-ABE. The new algorithm is shown in Fig. 6 . In addition to the users' information, PKG also needs to maintain a copy of the role inheritance tree. For each role assignment, if the operator is ''='' (namely, it is a positive assignment), PKG will traverse the role inheritance tree to check whether the user's role is equal to or senior to (which is indicated by the symbol in Fig. 6 ) the role r indicated in the extended leaf node. If so, the algorithm returns the extended attribute ''role = r''. Conversely, when the operator is ''!='' (namely, a negative assignment), PKG checks whether the user's role is neither equal to nor junior to (which is indicated by the symbol in Fig. 6 ) the role r. If not, the algorithm returns the extended attribute ''role! = r''; otherwise, it returns null. The verification of other operators is the same as the attribute verification algorithm in ECP-ABE and is also described in Fig. 6 . Finally, PKG retrieves some extended attributes that are used to generate a private key for the user.
2) SCHEME AND SCHEME MODEL By integrating DC-RBAC with ECP-ABE, we propose the RBAC-CPABE scheme, which can enforce access policies of DC-RBAC and encrypt data with ECP-ABE. The RBAC-CPABE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: the system initializes and generates the public parameters pk and the master keys mk.
• PolicySpecify: the data owner specifies the access policy in the form of DC-RBAC policy rules. Then, the policy is mapped to an extended access tree T * .
• Encrypt: the encryption party first transforms the extended tree T * to a standard tree T and then encrypts data using T . It produces a ciphertext C T * that contains T * . VOLUME 5, 2017
• KeyRequest: a user who wants to decrypt C T * first needs to analyze the structure of T * and extract the leaf nodes and extended leaf nodes. Then, the user applies for a private key by sending PKG the extracted parts.
• KeyGenerate: first, PKG extracts the attributes associated with the leaf nodes from user's attribute set. For the extended leaf nodes, PKG verifies the user's attributes using the attribute verification algorithm. Finally, PKG obtains a new attribute set w * and generates the private key sk w * corresponding to w * .
• Decrypt: the algorithm returns the plaintext m when w * satisfies the DC-RBAC policy. Otherwise it returns an error symbol ⊥. The model of the RBAC-CPABE scheme is illustrated in Fig. 7 . Compared with Fig. 1 , our model also contains the three parties, and the primary responsibility of each party is the same as in the classic CP-ABE scheme. Here, however, some processes have been added to support the RBAC-CPABE scheme. The changed operations are marked with red boxes in Fig. 7 .
In the RBAC-CPABE encryption mechanism, the data owner first specifies the access policy in the form of the DC-RBAC model; then, the DC-RBAC policy is mapped to the ECP-ABE access tree according to the mapping model. Data access includes two processes: a private key request and decryption, which are indivisible and are both performed by the decryption party. Before each decryption, the decryption party first sends the leaf nodes and the extended leaf nodes of the access tree to PKG to apply the private key. As a trusted party, PKG keeps a role inheritance tree as well as users' information, both of which are maintained by the system administrator. Then, PKG verifies whether the user's attributes and roles satisfy the extended attributes using the attribute verification algorithm. Finally, PKG generates a private key and returns it to the user. If and only if the user's roles, intrinsic attributes and environment information satisfy the DC-RBAC policy can the user successfully decrypt the ciphertext.
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) SECURITY
ECP-ABE has been proven secure against adaptive CPA based on the game detailed in Section III-C [10] , [11] .
Based on ECP-ABE, the RBAC-CPABE introduces some new security problems. First, the security proof of ECP-ABE requires that each attribute a i used to apply for the private key should not be included in the challenging extended access tree. However, in the RBAC-CPABE scheme, an adversary A challenges with a DC-RBAC access policy S instead of an extended tree T * . To ensure the security of RBAC-CPABE, this restriction should be modified. Second, the DC-RBAC policy is mapped to an extended tree before encryption. We need to consider whether the mapping process introduces any new security risk.
The security of RBAC-CPABE is analyzed as follows. (1) For the first problem, although A challenges with a DC-RBAC access policy S, A still gains no advantage in decrypting the ciphertext because the attribute set w = {a i |a i ∈ W } used to apply for the private key must satisfy the restriction that a i / ∈ S and that a i does not satisfy the role assignment and the constraints including complex operators. Then, we can conclude that a i / ∈ T * and a i does not satisfy the attributes expressed by the extended leaf nodes in T * . Thus, any attribute b i in the extended attribute set w * satisfies b i / ∈ T . Therefore, variation of the access policy challenge will not impact security.
(2) For the second problem, the mapping of the access policy S to the extended tree T * is visible to A. Therefore, compared with the ECP-ABE scheme, the attack capability of A does not increase. Through the analysis above we can conclude that the advantage that the adversary wins the game detailed in Section III-C in the RBAC-CPABE scheme is equivalent to the advantage in the ECP-ABE scheme. Hence, the RBAC-CPABE scheme maintains the security properties of the CP-ABE scheme on which it is based, and it is secure against CPA under the standard security model.
2) EFFICIENCY
The experiments in [10] and [11] indicated that the efficiency of ECP-ABE was nearly equal to that of the CP-ABE scheme on which it is based. RBAC-CPABE uses the same encryption and decryption algorithm as ECP-ABE; consequently, the calculation costs and the length of the ciphertext are the same as in ECP-ABE. However, there are two main differences between RBAC-CPABE and ECP-ABE that may introduce additional overhead:
• Mapping the DC-RBAC access policy to the extended tree of ECP-ABE at the encryption phase.
• Verification and generation of the extended attributes associated with role inheritance at the key generation phase. In the experiments, we compare the efficiency of RBAC-CPABE with the classical BSW as well as with ECP-ABE. We use the 3 groups of policy file shown in TABLE 3 as the test samples. Each group contains 10 test policy files in which the number of attribute nodes varies from 1 to 10. Group A consists of policies containing only standard attributes that are used as the policies of BSW scheme. Group B consists of policies containing user attribute constraints and environment constraints that are used in the ECP-ABE scheme. Group C consists of policies containing role assignments, user attribute constraints and environment constraints that are used in our RBAC-CPABE scheme.
An efficiency comparison is shown in Fig. 8 . The results of encryption, private key application and decryption are similar, i.e. the time consumption of RBAC-CPABE and ECP-ABE are nearly equal, and both are lower than that of BSW. In the encryption phase, the time required to map the DC-RBAC access policy to the ECP-ABE access tree is quite small and can be ignored. In the key application phase, the time used to verify the extended attributes associated with role inheritance also does not introduce extra overhead to the system. Hence, we can conclude that the efficiency of the RBAC-CPABE is not lower than that of the ECP-ABE scheme. However, the RBAC-CPABE scheme greatly enhances access control capabilities, and it includes the advantages of more flexibility, better role hierarchy handling ability and so on. In this paper, RBAC-CPABE was constructed based on the ECP-ABE scheme, by transitivity, the ITHJ09 scheme [32] . However, ECP-ABE can be used on any ABE schemes that utilize tree structure. Consequently, RBAC-CPABE also can be constructed based on any tree-based ABE scheme. The performance analysis indicates that RBAC-CPABE can maintain the security and efficiency properties of the ABE scheme that it is based on while substantially improving the access control capability.
3) DISCUSSION
In access control, privilege revocation is an intrinsic challenge. In ABE schemes, a widely used method is to update the private key for the remaining users who share the same attributes as the revoked user and re-encrypt the ciphertext that was previously encrypted with the attributes that the revoked user holds. Obviously, this method causes the revocation of the target user's privileges may also affect other un-revoked users, and it consumes some extra computational resources. In RBAC-CPABE, privilege revocation can be achieved efficiently because RBAC-CPABE is a onetime pad scheme. More specifically, because users need to apply for private key to PKG by sending it the attributes in the ciphertext before each decryption, as described in Section V-C.2, each private key can be used only once. Because the private key application is performed by the decryption client and is transparent to users, users cannot cache any private keys. Hence, privilege revocation can be achieved without affecting other users or re-encrypting the related ciphertext.
In addition, RBAC-CPABE also avoids key management problems because users need not store private keys and cannot cache any previously used private keys. This approach also avoids some other problems associated with key management such as key leakage, misuse and so on. Therefore, RBAC-CPABE enhances the security of the whole system.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF RBAC-CPABE
To investigate the application of RBAC-CPABE, we present an implemented framework for this scheme. The framework is based on the model of the RBAC-CPABE scheme (see Fig. 7 ), which contains three parts: PKG, the encryption party and the decryption party. To reduce the computational burden and avoid PKG becoming an efficiency bottleneck, we introduce the Attribute Authority (AA), which assumes part of the work of a traditional PKG.
To ensure secure communication, the sender should sign a message and the receiver should verify the sender's signature before responding to the request. In this framework, we use the IBE [2] scheme to sign and verify the identity. IBE does not require complex distribution and management of private keys, and the public parameters and private keys can be generated by PKG.
Computations on the tree structure and pairing operations in CP-ABE cause its efficiency to be lower than that of symmetrical encryption schemes. To improve the efficiency, we use a hybrid encryption method that includes the advanced encryption standard (AES) and RBAC-CPABE.
The implemented framework of RBAC-CPABE is illustrated in Fig. 9 . The framework can be divided into three parts: the cloud server space, which is used to store the protected data; the user space, which contains encryption and decryption users of the community; and the trust center space, which contains trusted servers that are responsible for managing users' attributes and generating private keys.
A. ENCRYPTION PARTY
Data owners define access policies and encrypt data in the Encryption Party. To publish data to a cloud server, the data owner uses the data and the DC-RBAC access policy as input. Then, the access policy is mapped to the equivalent extended tree with the policy mapping module. Next, the data is signed with the user's IBE private key and hybrid encryption is enforced using the signature and encryption module. More specifically, the data is encrypted with AES while the private key of AES is encrypted by RBAC-CPABE using the access policy tree. Finally, the ciphertext, consisting of the AES ciphertext, the RBAC-CPABE ciphertext, the access tree and the signature, is published to the cloud server.
B. DECRYPTION PARTY
Data access is achieved through the Decryption Party. The data access process consists of two integral steps as described in Section V-C.2 (i.e. private key application and data decryption). Using the RBAC-CPABE private key application module, the leaf nodes and extended leaf nodes of the access tree attached in the ciphertext are extracted and sent to AA along with the user's identity, forming a request to apply for an RBAC-CPABE private key. Before sending, the message is signed with the user's IBE private key. Users without an IBE private key must first apply for one through the IBE private key application module. After receiving the message from AA, the Decryption Party verifies the signature with the authentication module and then extracts the RBAC-CPABE private key. If the user's attributes satisfy the access policy, the decryption module will be able to decrypt the RBAC-CPABE ciphertext to obtain the AES private key with which the original data can be decrypted.
C. AA
The AA is responsible for authenticating users' attributes and invoking PKG to generate private keys. When receiving a message from a user, AA first verifies whether the message is from a valid user using the authentication module. If it is a valid message, AA analyzes the request type, which can be either an IBE private key request or a RBAC-CPABE private key request. If the request is for an IBE private key, AA extracts the identity of the user and sends it to PKG through the IBE private key application module. If the request is for a RBAC-CPABE private key, AA extracts the user's information through the management module with the user's identity. Then the RBAC-CPABE private key application module is used to verify the extended attributes with the user information and the role inheritance tree and generate the extended attribute set, which is sent to PKG to yield the user private key.
D. PKG
The main function of PKG in our framework is to generate private keys. Similar to AA, after receiving a message, PKG first verifies whether the message is from a valid AA using the authentication module and AA management module. When the request is valid, PKG generates the private key using either the IBE private key generation module and the RBAC-CPABE private key generation module according to the request type. The IBE private key is distributed physically, while the RBAC-CPABE private key is returned to the AA after being signed. Then AA signs and returns the message to the user after verifying the validity of PKG.
As the above process shows, by adopting RBAC-CPABE, data gains the ability to determine whether to authorize users depending entirely on an access policy embedded within the data itself. Therefore, this implementation of RBAC-CPABE can eliminate the dependence on third-party servers and can achieve self-contained data protection.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To address the data protection problem in cloud computing, we propose and implement a role-based self-contained data protection scheme called RBAC-CPABE. Based on the classic RBAC model, we first propose a data-centric access control model, DC-RBAC, which allows the data owner to specify individualized RBAC policies for each data VOLUME 5, 2017 object. Besides role-level constraints, DC-RBAC also contains user attribute constraints and environment constraints, which correspond to information about the authorized users and contextual information about the environment, respectively. Hence, DC-RBAC achieves more flexible and finegrained access control. Next, to construct the self-contained data protection mechanism, we fuse the DC-RBAC into ECP-ABE by extending ECP-ABE and defining a policy mapping model. By using RBAC-CPABE, information contained in the data itself determines whether users are authorized to perform decryption instead of relying on other parties. Besides ECP-ABE, RBAC-CPABE also can be constructed based on other tree-based ABE scheme to achieve the specific functionality of the ABE scheme. A security analysis and experiment results indicate that RBAC-CPABE does not add any security risk or computational overhead compared to the CP-ABE scheme on which it is based, but it substantially improves the access control capability. Hence, RBAC-CPABE can be used in clouds to achieve efficient protection for outsourced data.
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